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Abstract: The investment agreement relationship between China and Japan is complex. The 
many intersecting and overlapping agreements can rightly be described as a “noodle bowl of 
agreements.” The 1989 bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between China and Japan still stands. 
Japan can also free-ride on the negotiation outcome of China’s BITs and free trade agreements 
(FTAs) with other countries by using the most-favored-nation (MFN) provision in the 1989 
China-Japan BIT, which does not contain regional economic integration organization (REIO) 
exception rules. However, because the China-Japan BIT does not have investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS), it may face implementation problems. The China-Japan-Korea trilateral 
investment treaty (CJK TIT), in force since 2014, made improvements upon the 1989 BIT, but 
Japan is not entirely satisfied with the outcome. For Japan, pre-establishment national 
treatment (NT) and prohibition of various types of performance requirements are the most 
important negotiation items, but the CJK TIT insufficiently addressed those problems. 
Moreover, because the CJK TIT has MFN provisions with an REIO exception rule, better 
access to investment markets brought about by future FTAs such as the China-Korea FTA and 
the EU-China FTA cannot be imported into CJK TIT. Hence, in the long run, Japan needs to 
pursue an FTA investment chapter with China that covers both MFN and ISDS. 
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Japan can also free-ride on the negotiation outcome of China’s BITs and free trade 
agreements (FTAs) with other countries by using the most-favored-nation (MFN) provision 
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Japan-Korea trilateral investment treaty (CJK TIT), in force since 2014, made improvements 
upon the 1989 BIT, but Japan is not entirely satisfied with the outcome. For Japan, pre-
establishment national treatment (NT) and prohibition of various types of performance 
requirements are the most important negotiation items, but the CJK TIT insufficiently 
addressed those problems. Moreover, because the CJK TIT has MFN provisions with an 
REIO exception rule, better access to investment markets brought about by future FTAs such 
as the China-Korea FTA and the EU-China FTA cannot be imported into CJK TIT. Hence, in 
the long run, Japan needs to pursue an FTA investment chapter with China that covers both 
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1. Introduction 
 
Relations between China and Japan are central to economic cooperation in Asia, particularly 
when negotiating regional economic agreements. For both China and Japan, investment has 
been the central issue among all negotiation items in economic agreements, rather than trade 
and tariffs. The principal reason why Japan joins these agreements is not trade liberalization, 
but to secure non-discriminatory investment liberalization, including by prohibiting various 
performance requirements. In contrast, China remains cautious in allowing investment 
liberalization such as pre-establishment national treatment (NT) because it may hinder its 
national industrial policy (Berger 2013). Given these divergent investment goals, coming to 
an agreement on the international rules to govern country investment policy is difficult. The 
differences in the negotiating stances of the two countries concerning investment will likely 
be the greatest obstacle to current and future negotiations for economic agreements in Asia.  
 
China and Japan have already spent much time negotiating international investment 
agreements (IIAs). 1  The Investment Protection Treaty between China and Japan was 
originally signed in 1989. However, unlike other Chinese bilateral investment treaties (BITs), 
this treaty has not been renegotiated. In addition, the China-Japan-Korea Trilateral 
Investment Treaty (CJK TIT) was signed in 2012 and became effective in 2014, despite the 
fact that the 1989 BIT remains in force. There are other current and future negotiations for 
IIAs that involve or will involve both China and Japan. In 2014, negotiations for a China-
Japan-Korea Free Trade Agreement (CJK FTA) were launched, with investment as one of its 
core chapters. Moreover, negotiations started in 2012 to establish a Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) among the ASEAN+6 members2  that includes an investment 
chapter. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which includes Japan, was agreed to in 2015. 
Whether or not China joins the TPP in the future is an important item on the regional 
economic agenda. The TPP includes a significant investment chapter that is largely based on 
the North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA) model, but also incorporates modifications 
based on the United States (US) post-NAFTA experience (Hodgson 2015).   
 
This paper reviews the evolution of investment negotiation dynamics between China and 
Japan. It considers the future prospects for IIAs in Asia given the negotiation dynamics 
between the two largest economies in the region. In particular, we will closely examine the 
CJK TIT, which is one of few plurilateral investment treaties in Asia.3 Interestingly, the CJK 
TIT is one of the few relatively “Americanized” investment treaties signed by China, even 
though the US is not a contracting party (Chi 2015). The CJK TIT provides some insight into 
the prospect of future Asian IIAs involving the two countries, including negotiations on the 
proposed CJK FTA investment chapter. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the IIA policies of China and 
Japan and explains how they have evolved over time. Section 3 reviews two investment 
treaties signed by China and Japan: the China-Japan BIT in 1989 and the 2012 CJK TIT. We 
compare the quality of the CJK TIT with China-Japan BIT in 1989, the China-Korea BIT in 
2007, and the Japan-Korea BIT in 2003. This section also reviews the original positions of 
                                                          
1 In this chapter, IIAs refers to both investment treaties and investment chapters in free trade agreements (FTAs).   
2 ASEAN+6 includes the 10 ASEAN members plus China, Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India.  
3 Plurilateral investment treaties have three or more signatories.  
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China and Japan on critical CJK TIT investment points such as pre-establishment NT and 
examines whose preference prevailed. Section 4 examines the current negotiations over the 
CJK FTA investment chapter. It also touches on the current negotiations for a US-China BIT, 
China-Korea FTA, and European Union (EU)-China BIT and FTA, given that these IIAs 
impact China-Japan negotiations and IIAs in Asia. The final section concludes the paper.  
 
2. IIA Policies of China and Japan 
 
2.1. China’s IIA Policies  
 
Until 1978, China restricted inward foreign direct investment (FDI). The notion of private 
property was rejected under the planned economic system. China wanted to establish its own 
controlled economic development system rather than relying on foreign capital. Except for a 
limited number of joint ventures with former Soviet Union states, foreign investment was not 
allowed. Naturally, during this period, China did not sign any IIA to attract FDI or to give 
protection to the limited investments made by foreign entities.  
 
Economic reform started in late 1978 when a “socialist system with Chinese characteristics” 
was adopted. China began to understand how inward FDI could benefit economic 
development so its stance toward inward FDI also changed. China signed its first BIT with 
Sweden in 1982 and during this “first phase”, which lasted until 1998, it signed around 70 
BITs. The majority of these BITs were with developed countries. These agreements opted for 
limited investment protection through narrowly defined investor-state arbitration clauses (Fan 
2015). China’s first model BIT (formulated in 1984) did not include any NT provisions. 
Dispute resolution was either not included or only allowed for consideration of the amount of 
compensation. The second model BIT (formulated in 1989) made some improvements, such 
as the inclusion of NT provisions, but their scope was extremely limited. However, China’s 
first-phase BITs did include post-establishment (investment protection) most favored nation 
(MFN) status.     
 
By the late 1990s, a second phase for IIAs evolved as the Chinese government started to 
encourage outward investment, thereby significantly increasing investment outflows. In 
particular, China began investing heavily in resource sectors in developing countries, 
especially in Africa. Further, China became the then-largest investment recipient in the world. 
Naturally, Chinese IIA policies became more proactive. Accordingly, a third model BIT was 
formulated in 1997, including a comprehensive NT clause. Also, the model’s dispute 
settlement provisions were improved. Between 1998 and 2007, China signed around 40 BITs. 
During this period, the majority of BITs with developed countries signed between 1982 and 
1998 were also renegotiated and replaced with new ones, with the notable exception of Japan. 
Some BITs with developed countries included standstill commitments to non-conforming 
measures, meaning China would not increase discrimination toward foreign investors. 
  
A third phase began after 2007 as China moved from being a prime destination for inflows to 
becoming a massive capital exporter. Chinese firms with strong political support and 
incentives began investing abroad and found the need to protect their investments (Berger 
2008). Third-generation IIA provisions are more detailed and balanced. Chi (2015, p. 379) 
calls this the “Americanization” of Chinese IIAs. While China had previously followed 
European formats, it began signing American-style IIAs that included detailed provisions, 
broader coverage, a more self-contained structure and greater enforceability. For example, for 
investor-state arbitration, third-generation Chinese IIAs often include provisions concerning 
statutes of limitations, the constitution of tribunals, and consolidation (Fan 2015). However, 
at the same time, recent Chinese IIAs still have some restrictive language regarding the 
definition of investors. They often cite “substantial business rules,” meaning that 
incorporation (without substantial operations) in a partner country is insufficient to fall under 
the scope of an IIA. Moreover, pre-establishment NT remains excluded from third-generation 
IIAs, although pre-establishment MFN is covered. Table 1 summarizes the evolution of 
Chinese IIAs throughout the three phases of development. 
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Table 1: Evolution of Chinese IIAs  
 
 National treatment (NT) Most favored nation 
(MFN) 
Investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) 
First Phase 
(1980s-1990s) 
 No NT or restricted NT.  Post-establishment 
MFN.  
 No ISDS or ISDS 
limited to the 
amount of 
compensation.  
Second Phase 
(2000s)  
 BITs with developing 
countries: No NT or NT 
subject to national laws.  
 
 BITs with developed 
countries: (i) full post-
establishment NT; (ii) 
standstill commitment to 
non-conforming measures.  
 Post-establishment 
MFN. 
 Full ISDS. 
Third Phase 
(after 2007) 
 Pre-establishment NT not 
covered.  
 Pre-establishment 
MFN.  
 
 MFN not extended 
to ISDS. 
 Detailed ISDS 
provisions.  
Source: Compiled by author based on Berger (2013). 
 
2.2. Japan’s IIA Policies  
 
While Japan is known as a major investor in many parts of the world, especially in Asia, it 
had a surprisingly cautious attitude to investment inflows until very recently. Until the mid-
1970s, inward investment was heavily restricted via the Foreign Capital Law. After joining 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in the mid-1960s, 
investment deregulation started, but progress was slow. The Foreign Capital Law was only 
abolished in 1980.  
 
Japan signed several BITs between the mid-1970s and the late-1990s (first phase). However, 
Japan was not as keen to sign BITs and most agreements were proposed by its counterparts 
(Fan 2015). Through 2001, Japan had signed only nine BITs, with the majority of partners 
being small economies such as Egypt (1977), Sri Lanka (1982) and Bangladesh (1998), with 
the notable exception of China (1989). Japan’s BITs during this period covered only post-
establishment NT. But even post-establishment NT provisions were often restrictive. Japan 
did not have a model BIT and had no preference regarding the specific wording of NT 
provisions. In other words, it was “flexible” enough to accommodate partner’s concerns. 
Moreover, Japanese BITs during this period did not include clauses on fair and equitable 
treatment (FET).  
 
One reason Japan did not have a strong interest in BITs, even after it became one of the 
world’s leading investors, was that it had a strong preference for multilateral investment 
regimes. An OECD ministerial meeting in May 1995 agreed to begin negotiating a 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). The MAI was expected to cover both pre-
establishment and post-establishment. A leaked draft of the MAI suggests it would be a 
comprehensive and binding investment agreement, consisting of 12 sections.4 Although the 
MAI negotiations were initially conducted among OECD countries, it was expected that non-
OECD members would later join the agreement. The Japanese government and industry was 
a strong proponent of the MAI. In fact, a report prepared in April 1996 by Keidanren, the 
largest business association in Japan, emphasized two systemic issues relating to the MAI. 
                                                          
4 The sections included in the MAI were the following: (i) general provisions; (ii) scope and application; (iii) 
treatment of investors and investments; (iv) investment protection; (v) dispute settlement; (vi) exceptions and 
safeguards; (vii) financial services; (viii) taxation; (ix) country-specific exceptions; (x) relationship to other 
international agreements; (xi) implementation and obligations; and (xii) final provisions.   
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First, the report argued that MAI should be open for accession by non-OECD members and 
that Japan should play an important role in bringing in Asian economies, as Japan was then 
the only Asian country in the OECD. Second, the relationship between the MAI and existing 
regional and bilateral investment treaties was underscored. Keidanren felt that violations of 
MFN rules in the MAI by signing bilateral or regional investment treaties should not disrupt 
the interests of non-treaty members. This example well illustrates Japan’s pro-multilateralism 
approach to investment. However, in December 1998, a formal decision to terminate MAI 
negotiations was made at an informal OECD meeting.5  
 
The failure of the MAI pushed Japan to pursue second generation BITs. In fact, in November 
1998 Japan began negotiating a Japan-Korea BIT (signed in 2002), the very first IIA 
categorized as second generation. Interestingly, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry felt the Japan-Korea BIT was “equivalent” to the MAI.6  
 
Some may argue that Japan’s engagement in economic partnership agreements (EPAs) came 
resulted from the abandonment of its multilateralism-centric trade policy in the late 1990s. 
This argument implies that the shift in Japan’s IIA policy was merely a side effect of the shift 
in trade policy because an investment chapter is only one of many components of an EPA. 
However, it is important to note that Japan’s active bilateral and/or regional economic policy 
began with investment rather than trade. Negotiations on the Japan-Korea BIT started before 
negotiations began on its first FTA (the Japan-Singapore EPA). In fact, some argue that 
investment, not trade, is the core component of Japanese EPAs (for example, see Hatch 2005). 
 
2.3. Comparative Analysis of China and Japan  
 
A comparison of the evolution of Chinese and Japanese IIAs is summarized in Table 2. 
Several important observations can be drawn from the comparison.  
 
 
Table 2: Summary of the Development of IIAs of China and Japan 
 
China Japan 
No BIT (1949-1978)  
• Restrictions on foreign direct investment 
(FDI) 
No BIT (1950s-mid 1970)  
• Restrictions on FDI 
First Generation (1978-1998) 
• Reform and opening up; Aimed to attract 
FDI 
• Growth in BITs, but conservative approach 
(FDI importer perspective)  
First Generation (1976-2001)  
• Expansion of FDI inflows and large 
declines in FDI outflows 
• Passive negotiators in BITs, restrictive 
approach (BITs mainly proposed by 
the counterparty)  
Second Generation (1998-2007)  
• ‘Going global’ strategy; began to become 
FDI exporter, more liberal view on 
investment protection;  
• Pro-investor BITs (FDI exporter 
perspective)  
Second Generation (2002-onward)  
• FDI exporting country 
• Pro-investor IIAs (FDI exporter 
perspective) 
Third Generation (2007-onward) 
• Characteristics of both inflow and outflow 
of FDI 
• More balanced and more detailed BITs and 
FTAs  
 
Source: Compiled by author. 
                                                          
5  Several salient reasons for the failure of MAI negotiations included criticism from non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) that the MAI paid little attention to labor and environmental issues; criticism from 
developing countries that MAI reflected only the views of developed countries; and concerns over the capital 
flow liberalization triggered by the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. 
6 See: http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/asia/s_korea/html/jkbia_gaiyo.html  
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First, several commonalities between the two countries can be seen. Each country’s IIA 
policy evolved over time. Basically, both countries began at the “No BIT” stage with FDI 
highly restricted and only restrictive IIAs were signed early on. More recent IIAs are more 
liberal. Changes occurred by stage or phase rather than as a steady or constant development. 
In other words, IIAs signed during the same stage are more or less similar. The change in 
stage is more evident in China, which used model BITs. But Japan also shows clear phases in 
the evolution of its IIAs.  
 
Second, while more recent China and Japan IIAs are more liberal, the restrictiveness of IIAs 
differs significantly. For example, both China and Japan started to engage in BITs in the mid-
1970s upon partner requests. However, the first Japanese BITs were more liberal than those 
involving China. This has an important implication. Since preferred restrictions vary across 
Northeast Asia, bilateral or regional IIA negotiations between or among them tend to be 
challenging. In fact, as we will see later, the 1989 China-Japan BIT was never renegotiated.   
 
It is interesting that what triggered more liberal IIAs varies among countries. The investment 
position (whether FDI importer or exporter) is critical for determining IIA policy because 
more investment security is needed for FDI exporting countries. If a country wants to protect 
investments in partner countries, it should offer reciprocity. China’s shift to second 
generation IIAs clearly came once it started to invest abroad, especially in Africa. The 
external environment also affects IIA policies. The MAI failure made Japan realize that an 
alternative to the multilateral approach was necessary. For Japan, even as it massively 
invested in Asia in the 1990s, multilateral investment negotiations were more important than 
BITs.  
 
3. IIAs between China and Japan 
 
3.1. The 1989 China-Japan Investment Protection Treaty 
 
Negotiations for the China-Japan Investment Protection Treaty started in 1982 with the BIT 
signed on August 27, 1988, and entered into force on May 14, 1989. Both China and Japan 
IIA policy were in their respective first phases when this treaty was negotiated. While Japan 
was already an active player in international investment by the 1980s, especially after the 
1985 Plaza Accord, its IIA policy was not proactive.  
 
Naturally, the 1989 BIT was not ambitious. Since first-generation IIAs of the two countries 
did not usually include pre-establishment NT, it was not covered in the BIT. Post-
establishment NT was included, but policies inconsistent with NT are permitted for purposes 
relating to maintaining public order, national security or sound development of the national 
economy. But again, both China and Japan’s first-generation IIAs included restrictive 
language when outlining post-establishment NT. Perhaps the two countries held different 
views on investor state dispute settlement (ISDS). While Japan’s first-generation IIAs 
included ISDS and often mention the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID), Chinese first-generation IIAs seldom included ISDS. Since the scope of 
ISDS under the China-Japan BIT is limited to the amount of compensation, Chinese 
preference prevailed, possibly because China was not a part of the ICSID convention at that 
time.    
 
Article 15 of the 1989 BIT provides for the agreement to be in effect for 10 years, although it 
“shall continue in force” unless terminated. Either party could request renegotiation toward 
the end of the period, though such a request never materialized. Apparently, neither country 
wanted the agreement terminated because the investment protection was valued. This is in 
sharp contrast with the Chinese BITs with Western European countries from the1980s, which 
were replaced by new ones in the early 2000s (for example, the 1983 China-Germany BIT 
was replaced with a new BIT in 2003). The 1989 China-Japan Investment Protection Treaty 
remains in force, despite the CJK TIT becoming effective in 2014 (see following section). 
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Meanwhile, the original BIT between China and Korea was signed in 1992. It was initially 
effective for 5 years, but has been extended on an annual basis ever since. While the 1992 
BIT was not particularly ambitious, it was replaced by a new BIT in 2007 after successful 
renegotiations. While only the amount of compensation can be submitted for dispute 
settlement under the old BIT, there is no such restriction under the 2007 BIT. FET was also 
included in the new BIT. However, the new agreement does not cover post-establishment NT. 
Again, Chinese preference prevailed.    
 
In short, many Chinese BITs signed in the 1980s and 1990s were renegotiated and replaced 
by new BITs, with the Chinese BITs with Western European countries and the BIT with 
Korea being renegotiated. In contrast, the 1989 China-Japan BIT was not renegotiated and 
remains in effect. As shown in Table 3, the treatment Japan received was not on par with that 
of other countries such as Korea. In particular, major concerns for Japan included (i) the lack 
of a prohibition of performance requirements, (ii) the possible introduction of restrictions 
subject to domestic regulations and laws (such as expropriation, restrictions on transfers), and 
(iii) limited access to an investor-state dispute mechanism. Naturally, by the time the new 
China-Korea BIT came into effect, Japan felt it was necessary to improve its BIT with China. 
Because of Japan’s large amount of investment assets in China, the business sector in Japan 
was particularly intent on improving the agreement.     
 
Two things stand out concerning the MFN provisions in the 1989 China-Japan BIT. First, the 
MFN provision does not include a regional economic integration organization (REIO) 
exception clause. 7  When the MFN provision in an investment treaty includes an RIEO 
exception, only provisions in other investment treaties can be imported; provisions in other 
FTAs cannot be used (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD] 
2004). The China-Japan BIT can conveniently import both provisions from other investment 
treaties and the investment provisions in FTAs signed by either China or Japan with other 
partners. Second, the MFN provisions in the China-Japan BIT cover both post- and pre-
establishment NT (see Table 3). The treatment accorded nationals and companies of the other 
contracting party regarding investments, returns and business activities in connection with 
investment shall have MFN status. This implies that better market access under the provisions 
of others IIAs such as provisions on investment liberalization and prohibition of performance 
requirement can be imported into the China-Japan BIT using the MFN provisions. It also 
applies to judicial access, administrative tribunals and agencies (domestic remedies). 
However, the scope of international disputes and access to ICSID is not covered by MFN 
provisions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 The absence of REIO exception in the 1989 China-Japan BIT is partly because both China and Japan had not 
signed any FTA or REIO by that time.  
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Table 3: Comparative Analysis of Investment Treaties in Northeast Asia  
 
 China-Japan BIT  
(1989) 
Japan-
Korea BIT 
(2003) 
China-
Korea BIT 
(2007) 
CJK TIT 
(2012) 
NT (pre-establishment) No Yes No No 
NT (post-establishment) Yes (discrimination 
possible for public 
order, etc.) 
Yes Yes Yes 
MFN (pre-establishment) Yes Yes (REIO 
exception) 
Yes Yes (REIO 
exception) 
MFN (post-establishment) Yes  Yes (REIO 
exception) 
Yes Yes (REIO 
exception) 
Negative list No Yes No No 
FET Yes (limited scope) Yes Yes Yes 
Umbrella clause No No Yes Yes 
Expropriation and 
Compensation  
Yes (subject to laws; 
limited to MFN for 
compensation for 
damages)  
Yes Yes Yes 
MFN and NT due to armed 
conflict, etc. 
Yes (limited to NT) Yes Yes Yes 
Transfers Yes (restriction 
possible based on 
domestic regulations 
Yes Yes Yes 
ISDS  Yes (limited to the 
amount of 
compensation) 
Yes Yes Yes 
State-State Dispute Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
PR (export restriction)  No No No Yes 
PR (local procurement 
requirement)  
No Yes Yes 
(limited)  
Yes 
PR (local content 
requirement)   
No Yes No Yes 
PR (export-import balance 
requirement)  
No Yes No Yes 
PR (export requirement)  No Yes No  Yes 
(limited) 
PR (domestic sale 
restriction requirement)  
No Yes No No 
PR (local senior 
management  requirement)  
No Yes No No 
PR (local employment 
requirement)  
No Yes No No 
PR (regional headquarters 
requirement)  
No Yes No No 
PR (R&D requirement )  No Yes No No 
PR (technology transfer 
requirement)  
No Yes Yes 
(limited) 
Yes 
(limited)  
PR (monopolistic supply 
requirement)  
No Yes No No 
PR = performance requirement prohibited 
Source: Compiled by author. 
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3.2. China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Investment Treaty (CJK TIT)  
 
At the China-Japan-Korea trilateral summit meeting in October 2003 in Bali, Indonesia, the 
three leaders agreed to launch a joint study group of business, government and academia to 
examine the feasibility of a CJK TIT. The report was finished in September 2004. By then, 
the differences in preferences between China and Japan over the modality of a possible 
trilateral investment treaty became clear. As summarized in Table 4, Japan, together with 
Korea, felt that strong rules on investment were necessary, while China wanted to maintain 
some policy space, given its status as a developing country. It is interesting that both Japan 
and Korea insisted that the Japan-Korea BIT should be the basis of a CJK TIT. As discussed 
above, the 2002 Japan-Korea BIT was a turning point in Japan’s IIA policies and marked the 
beginning of Japan’s second-generation BITs. The treaty covers both pre-establishment and 
post-establishment. It employs negative lists, and almost all critical IIA elements are included, 
except for an umbrella clause. Further, all major performance requirements are prohibited, 
other than export restrictions (see Table 3). In contrast, China insisted that existing regimes 
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the 1989 China-Japan BIT had been 
working well. Due to differences, the launch of official treaty negotiations was delayed. In 
2005 and 2006, no formal negotiation was launched, though several low-key 
intergovernmental meetings were held.  
 
 
Table 4: Negotiation Positions for CJK TIT 
 
Issues Position of Japan and Korea Position of China 
Transparency 
 
The principle of transparency as 
contained in the recently concluded 
investment arrangements, including the 
Japan-Korea Investment Treaty should 
be incorporated and further 
strengthened as much as possible.  
The rules for transparency as 
contained in the relevant rules and 
provisions in the World Trade 
Organization should serve as 
reference.  
Prohibition of 
Performance 
Requirements 
 
Provisions that prohibits performance 
requirements in recently concluded 
investment arrangements, including the 
Japan-Korea Investment Treaty should 
be the basis for future deliberation.  
The prohibition of performance 
requirements could be researched 
further in the future. 
Dispute 
Settlement 
The dispute settlement mechanism in 
recently concluded investment 
arrangements, including the Japan-
Korea Investment Treaty could be good 
models for the possible investment 
arrangement. 
 
The dispute settlement 
mechanism established by China-
Japan, China-Korea and Japan-
Korea BITs works effectively. 
The existing mechanism can be 
strengthened and fully utilized in 
dealing with disputes concerning 
investment.  
Pre-
establishment 
National 
Treatment 
Pre-establishment national treatment is 
essential to the arrangement, as many 
recently concluded investment 
arrangements contain this principle and 
the possible arrangement of the three 
countries should have the same 
principle. The differences in economic 
development should be duly considered 
and accommodated in a practical 
manner, e.g., making use of exception 
clauses in the arrangement.  
It is premature for pre-
establishment national treatment 
to be included in the possible 
arrangement due to the 
differences in the development 
stages of the three countries. 
Source: The Report of the Joint Study on the Possible Modality of Trilateral Investment 
Arrangements among China, Japan, and Korea (Available 
at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/investment/jck/pdfs/jck_kaigo_04e.pdf)  
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Japan had a strong interest in the trilateral investment treaty, given that renegotiating its 
bilateral treaty with China was unlikely. This was especially true when the new China-Korea 
BIT came into effect in 2007. Japan wanted to create a level playing field with Korean 
industries in the Chinese market. Korea also expected that, by collaborating with Japan, a 
trilateral treaty could be lead to a stronger treaty than its BIT with China. In fact, as we will 
see later, the position of Japan and Korea were almost the same on various issues covered by 
BITs; the two formed a coalition in regards to China. Finally, in January 2007, official 
negotiations for the CJK TIT began. However, progress was slow. This was mainly due to 
China’s reluctance to accept pre-establishment NT to treat national and foreign companies 
equally under governmental regulations (Yoshimatsu 2014). After nearly 10 years since the 
trilateral summit, the CJK TIT was signed in May 2012 and came into effect in May 2014. 
 
The CJK TIT reflects Japan’s preferences to a certain degree. In particular, while the focus of 
dispute settlement was limited to the amount of compensation under the 1989 China-Japan 
BIT, this limitation was removed in the CJK TIT. Moreover, the CJK TIT sets very clear 
ISDS procedural guidelines, minimizing the ambiguity of dispute settlement procedures. 
These provisions cover a wide range of issues from initiation of arbitration to award 
enforcement, which makes the CJK TIT “Americanized” (Chi 2015). However, this was no 
longer controversial for China because the majority of third-generation Chinese IIAs have 
full and detailed ISDS provisions (see Table 1).    
 
Overall, however, Japan was unsatisfied with the CJK TIT. First, it covers only post-
establishment, not pre-establishment NT. And, unlike the Japan-Korea BIT, it does not use a 
negative list approach. Second, the transparency provision was strengthened compared with 
the China-Japan BIT (Article 10). Signatories must provide a reasonable opportunity for 
public comments on regulations related to investment and consider them before adoption. 
However, the interval between the announcement of a new regulation and its implementation 
was not clearly specified and is dependent on the best efforts of the nation creating the 
regulation (i.e., the country “shall endeavor” to provide a reasonable period for public 
comment). Third, performance requirements prohibited under the CJK TIT remained limited 
(Article 7). In addition to the measures listed in WTO Trade-Related Investment Measures 
(TRIM), only two measures are prohibited by CJK TIT: export requirements and technology 
transfer. 8  Moreover, prohibition is limited to imposing unreasonable or discriminatory 
measures concerning the two. Hence when a “reasonable” technical transfer request is 
imposed in a non-discriminatory manner, it would be acceptable as far as the CJK TIT is 
concerned. As seen in Table 3, the Japan-Korea BIT included a much longer list of prohibited 
performance requirements. 
 
The only reason why Japan eventually signed the CJK TIT was that it was still better than the 
1989 BIT with China. The prolonged negotiations for the CJK TIT did not benefit Japan, as it 
had to rely on the old BIT. Japan preferred concluding the prolonged CJK TIT negotiations 
and beginning a new negotiation on the CJK FTA investment chapter. In fact, by 2012, the 
joint study on CJK FTA was already launched (see below).  
 
The relationship between CJK TIT and previous BITs between the three countries requires a 
careful assessment. It is important to note that the old BITs remain in force. Article 25 
(Relation to Other Agreements) of the CJK TIT says  
 
Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the rights and obligations of a Contracting Party, 
including those relating to treatment accorded to investors of another Contracting Party, under 
                                                          
8 When IIAs cover pre-establishment, the prohibition of performance requirements is powerful. This is because 
the performance requirement is usually imposed when companies decide to make new investment. However, the 
effectiveness of the prohibition of performance requirement is unclear when IIAs cover only post-establishment. 
If a host government attempts to impose a performance requirement upon the expansion of existing investment 
(post-establishment), provisions other than the prohibition of performance requirement, such as FET provisions, 
seem to be effective enough to prevent the implementation of such performance requirement policies.   
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any bilateral investment agreement between those two Contracting Parties existing on the date 
of entry into force of this Agreement, so long as such a bilateral agreement is in force.  
 
Note: It is confirmed that, when an issue arises between an investor of a Contracting Party and 
another Contracting Party, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed so as to prevent the 
investor from relying on the bilateral investment agreement between those two Contracting 
Parties which is considered by the investor to be more favorable than this Agreement. 
 
One possible reason why the old BITs, especially the 1989 China-Japan BIT, remain in place 
is the effectiveness of their MFN provisions. As mentioned previously, the earlier BIT and 
the 2007 China-Korea BIT do not have an REIO exception, unlike the CJK TIT (Article 3.4 
(a)) and the 2003 Japan-Korea BIT (see 4.2 for details).  
 
4. Future Prospects for China-Japan Investment Negotiations   
 
4.1. Negotiations between China and Japan over a China-Japan-Korea Free Trade 
Agreement (CJK FTA)   
 
China, Japan and Korea are currently negotiating a CJK FTA, which also includes an 
investment chapter. At a trilateral summit in October 2009, the leaders of the three countries 
agreed to launch a joint study group comprising business, government and academia 
(Hamanaka 2014).  
 
The question is whether or not conclusion of the CJK TIT makes future investment 
negotiations in Asia easier. Some argue the CJK TIT can form the basis for future investment 
negotiations involving both China and Japan, including the CJK FTA. Under this view, the 
investment chapter in the CJK FTA can replicate the CJK TIT with limited improvements. 
However, it is also possible that the CJK TIT could make the negotiations for a CJK FTA 
investment chapter even more difficult, because some changes and additions are required to 
justify a new agreement.  
 
From China’s perspective, the investment agreement has been completed and authorities 
believe any investment chapter to an FTA should basically follow what was agreed to in the 
trilateral investment treaty. From Japan’s perspective, however, it is pointless to sign a 
trilateral FTA given its strong interests in investment issues unless the investment chapter 
shows a significant improvement. In fact, according to the March 2012 Joint Study Report for 
the FTA, Japan argued that  
 
The three countries should conclude as soon as possible the trilateral investment agreement 
which is being negotiated but far less ambitious in its substance than what the investment 
chapter of a CJK FTA is expected to be and should then launch negotiations on the investment 
chapter of a CJK FTA in terms of a high level of investment liberalization, building on the 
concluded trilateral investment agreement. 
 
The report also underscores the disagreement between the two governments (Table 5). 
Interestingly, Japan and Korea again formed a coalition against China in the negotiations. 
Japan wants the CJK FTA investment chapter to go far beyond the existing agreements—
including the CJK TIT and WTO TRIM. It prefers a negative list approach, meaning all 
sectors will be liberalized unless there are specific reservations. China wants policy flexibility 
and emphasizes investment facilitation and promotion (such as information exchange) over 
investment liberalization. It wants to follow TRIM, meaning only “trade related aspects of 
investment” should be covered with investment liberalization itself not specifically on the 
agenda. While the formal intergovernmental negotiations for the FTA started in November 
2012, it remains unclear how far China will move from what was agreed to in the CJK TIT.    
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Table 5: Negotiation Position for a CJK FTA Investment Chapter   
 
 Position of Japan and Korea Position of China 
The level of 
ambition 
The essential elements to be covered by 
the CJK FTA include national treatment 
(NT) and most favored nation (MFN) at 
the pre- and post-establishment phases, 
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
procedures with a wide ranging scope, 
prohibition of performance requirements 
(PR) beyond the Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIM) level, a 
negative list approach integrated with 
the services chapter, and any other 
facilitating elements in a future CJK 
FTA.  
 
The investment chapter in a future CJK 
FTA should surpass protections and 
liberalizations in the BITs among the 
three countries, including the CJK TIT. 
 
The CJK FTA should seek an investment 
chapter that provides better protection, 
greater transparency and a more effective 
dispute resolution mechanism, and any 
other facilitation and promotion elements 
that could further promote intra-investment 
flow, including information exchange on 
investment opportunities and information 
sharing on laws and regulations in the field 
of investment.  
 
Investment promotion and liberalization 
depend much more on the specific needs of 
individual countries, their state of 
economic and legal maturity, and their 
own development strategies. In future 
negotiations on the investment chapter, 
more flexibility should be given to China 
for adaption and modification in its 
liberalization process. 
Scope and 
Coverage 
The investment chapter of a CJK FTA 
should cover all industry sectors, 
including services sectors, and measures 
adopted or maintained not only by 
central governments but also by regional 
and local governments. 
The scope and coverage of the investment 
chapter should be discussed at the 
negotiation stage being consistent with 
TRIM, including possible approaches 
adopted for the negotiations. 
Source: Joint Study Report for an FTA among China, Japan and Korea. 
Available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/24/3/pdfs/0330_10_01.pdf 
 
 
4.2. China’s Other IIAs: Can Japan Free-ride on Others?  
 
As seen, three elements are critical for Japan’s IIA negotiations: (i) pre-establishment NT; 
(ii) detailed ISDS procedures; and (iii) prohibition of performance requirements. Among 
these, pre-establishment NT is the issue where there is a serious disagreement between Japan 
and China. So far, China has not signed any IIAs that cover pre-establishment NT. In the 
recently concluded China-Canada BIT, NT is afforded only for “expansion, management, 
conduct, operation and sale or other distortion of investment” (Schott and Cimino 2015). 
Moreover, the liberalization commitment by China and Canada under the BIT is not 
reciprocal (Harten 2014). However, China’s treaty practice may change in the near future. 
Three ongoing negotiations require careful examination.     
 
United States (US)–China BIT. Negotiations over a proposed US-China BIT is likely to 
affect Japan’s attitude toward investment negotiations vis-à-vis China. While negotiations are 
ongoing, it is likely that investment liberalization (pre-establishment NT) is included in the 
BIT (Miner and Hufbauer 2015).   
 
Japan does not want to fall behind the US by signing a CJK FTA or RCEP with a poor 
quality investment chapter. This would be similar to the 2007 experience where the China-
Korea BIT was improved, while the China-Japan treaty was not. Japan does not seem to have 
large bargaining power vis-à-vis China in investment negotiations because, for example, it 
does not have an investment screening process for Chinese investment, unlike the US.  
 
Both the CJK TIT and the China-Japan BIT have MFN provisions. Hence, any improvement 
in market access given to the US by China under a future US-China BIT, including pre-
establishment NT, should be given to Japan (and Korea) as well. In this sense, Japan can 
“free ride” on the US-China BIT using the MFN in BIT and TIT with China.  
 
13 
 
China-Korea FTA. As discussed previously, the 2007 China-Korea BIT does not cover pre-
establishment NT (see Table 3). Meanwhile, the China-Korea FTA came into force in 
December 2015. While its investment chapter does not cover pre-establishment NT, an 
important agreement was made in the annex on “guidelines for subsequent negotiations” 
(Annex 22-A). Based on this, the two shall start subsequent negotiations not later than 2 years 
following the FTA taking effect and the negotiations are expected to conclude within 2 years. 
The Annex states that “the subsequent negotiation will be conducted based on a negative list 
approach covering pre-establishment phase of investment and trade in services in mode 3”. 
Hence, it is natural to infer that pre-establishment NT will be covered in the renegotiated 
FTA between China and Korea.  
 
The question is whether Japan can free-ride on the future China-Korea FTA investment 
chapter. There is no FTA covering both Japan and China at this stage. Therefore, Japan 
cannot import provisions using its FTA MFN provisions. However, as discussed, the 1989 
China-Japan BIT in has MFN provisions without REIO exception. Hence, arguably, Japan 
can free-ride on the China-Korea FTA investment chapter based on its old 1989 BIT, which 
is still in place after the launch of CJK TIT.  
 
European Union (EU)-China BIT/FTA. There are currently 26 BITs between China and 
EU members. However, the Lisbon Treaty recognizes EU competence over investment issues. 
This means that Brussels, not each capital, should negotiate investment treaties. Hence all 26 
BITs will be replaced by a single EU-China BIT. Negotiations continue, but pre-
establishment NT will likely be covered, just like in the the US-China BIT (Garcia-Gallardo 
and Jin 2015).   
 
While the immediate goal of the two sides is to sign stand-alone treaties on investment rather 
than an FTA (Tams 2015), it seems that China has a strong interest in negotiating an EU-
China FTA for geo-political considerations (Zhang 2015). The proposed BIT can be a 
stepping stone to an FTA, but China may be more willing to commit to substantial investment 
liberalization under an FTA. Either way, Japan can free-ride, because the 1989 BIT has an 
MFN clause without REIO exception.  
 
In summary, when new or renegotiated Chinese BITs have better investment market access 
provisions, Japan can import them into CJK TIT, using its MFN provision. When a new or 
renegotiated Chinese FTA has a better investment market access provisions, Japan can import 
them into 1989 China-Japan BIT, using its MFN provision (without REIO exception). One 
important reservation is that the 1989 BIT does not cover ISDS (domestic remedies only) and 
its MFN scope is also limited to domestic remedies. This implies that there is no guarantee 
that a better investment market access in other IIAs such as pre-establishment NT is actually 
given to Japan due to the lack of an enforcement mechanism.    
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The investment agreements between China and Japan are complex and form a typical 
example of the “noodle bowl” of IIAs that exist in Asia (Chaisse and Hamanaka 2014). The 
1989 BIT between China and Japan is still in effect and continues to affect negotiations and 
agreements between the two countries. The CJK TIT, in force since 2014, makes 
improvements upon the 1989 BIT, but Japan was not entirely satisfied about the outcome. For 
Japan, pre-establishment NT and prohibition of various types of performance requirements 
are the most important negotiation items, but the CJK TIT insufficiently addressed those 
problems. However, because CJK TIT has MFN provisions (with an REIO exception rule), a 
better outcome for market access may result from future BITs (not FTAs) such as US-China 
BIT and China-EU BIT, the provisions of which can be imported into the CJK TIT. 
 
So far, China has not signed any IIA that covers pre-establishment NT. However, there are 
several important ongoing IIA negotiations involving China, including with the US and EU, 
that will likely cover pre-establishment NT. While the December 2015 China-Korea FTA 
does not cover pre-establishment NT, it has an important annex that stipulates guidelines for 
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subsequent negotiations. These will be based on a negative list approach covering pre-
establishment NT and shall be conducted within 2 years. Therefore, it is likely that the China-
Korea FTA will have pre-establishment NT by 2017 or 2018.  
 
Japan does not have a strong incentive to conclude an FTA investment chapter with China 
(such as a CJK FTA and RCEP) in a hasty way, because the country can already free-ride on 
the negotiation outcome of not only BITs but also FTAs signed by China with others, using 
the MFN provision in the 1989 China-Japan BIT that does not contain an REIO exception 
rules. In other words, while the substance of the original BIT is poor, its MFN clause is of use. 
In a long run, however, Japan needs a FTA investment chapter with China that covers both 
MFN9 and ISDS for two reasons. First, the 1989 China-Japan BIT has MFN without the 
REIO exception rules, but it does not include ISDS, which is not covered under MFN 
provisions. Hence, even though the 1989 China-Japan BIT can import better market access 
provisions from other BITs/FTAs, it may face implementation problems. Second, the CJK 
TIT is not effective in importing investment provisions from other FTAs such as those in 
China-Korea FTA and China-EU FTA because of the REIO exception rule. The timing of 
when a future FTA investment chapter between Japan and China will likely be after the 
conclusion of China’s BIT negotiations with the US and Europe, because, then, Japan can 
request that an investment chapter better than those agreements be included in the FTA. 
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